The Neglected Duty/Jansen
by Johannes J.G. Jansen (1986).
This is a translation with commentary of al-Faridah al-Gha'ibah, or "The Neglected Duty," a pamphlet which was left behind with Sadat's body by his assassins, who were members of the Muslim Brotherhood; their lawyers argued that it presented "a valid, Islamic defense" of the assassination. The neglected or forgotten duty, of course, is the duty of jihad, "war against unbelievers."
After Sadat's assassins were executed, it was felt necessary to publish a refutation of the pamphlet by the Mufti of Egypt, Shayk al-Haqq, which in turn made it necessary to publish the pamphlet itself. Thus, according to Jansen, did a long-suppressed discourse finally break into print in Egypt.
Through a close analysis of the text, Jansen argues persuasively that the document represents a culmination of sorts of a debate that had been taking place among many parts of Egyptian society, but up to that point had been completely censored by the state under Nasser and then Sadat. The argument is structured point-by-point as if in response to an imaginary questioner (most arguments in the pamphlet begin with some variation of "some people say …"). Jansen is able to guess which entities are being addressed -- the Islamic authorities at al-Azhar University, the Sufi community, various notable Muslim scholars and authorities -- and further presents some of the responses to the document by these very same groups and individuals. Many of the refutations don't refute nearly as much as one might have expected, and to the extent that they do, are presented with various degrees of qualification, implying that the Muslim Brotherhood had already at that point gained considerable ground in the debate.
To an extent, the document serves as a sort of Rosetta Stone for some Islamic writing that was publishable under state censorship, because it was encoded in the terminology of the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, Jansen argues, using the Faridah as a key, that when Shayk al-Sharawi, (whose weekly religious tv show Nur'ala Nur ("Light on Light") was broadcast in Egypt and other Arab nations in the early 1970's) writes: "Glory to God … who preserved cells of belief, which heathendom does not know how to exterminate, and the core of which tyranny does not know how to corrupt," what he really means is "Glory to God who preserved cells of activists which our pagan government does not know how to exterminate, and the core of which the present regime does not know how to buy off by offering them jobs and salaries."
The central thesis of the Faridah is that "the establishment of an Islamic State and the reintroduction of the Caliphate were not only already predicted by the Apostle of God--God's peace be upon him--but they are, moreover, part of the Command of the Lord--Majestic and Exalted He is--for which every Muslim should exert every conceivable effort in order to execute it." All sources of Islamic authority, the Qur'an, the sunna (the traditions set by the exemplary life of the Prophet), the hadith (sayings attributed to the Prophet that were reported by his associates after his death) and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) are employed to demolish objections to this vision and to exhort the reader to jihad in its pursuit. (It will be of some interest to infidels to note that the greater part of the debate here is about whether it is permissible to accuse other Muslims of apostasy and engage in jihad against them, since the heads of all the secular Arab states at the time, including Sadat, were practicing Muslims. Implicitly, then, the killing of actual infidels is considered uncontroversial by the author(s)).
It is difficult to overstate the logical force of the arguments presented in the Faridah. As Jansen remarks, "When even a non-Muslim reader of the Faridah has every now and then the impression that everything he ever read from the Qur'an, the Tradition, and the books of fiqh suddenly falls into place, how much more will the text of the Faridah evoke this feeling with Muslim readers? The Faridah strongly suggests that it offers a comprehensive view of the history of Islam which is based on all relevant sources, and it does so impressively." It is really a shame that this book is not more widely available (I couldn't find a used copy anywhere), because it does conclusively demonstrate that Islamic "fundamentalism" is not "crazy," but instead makes almost oppressively logical sense within its own terms.
It also makes a great deal of sense within its own political and historical context. The work of Muhammad Jalil Kishk, "a prolific writer with Muslim Brotherhood affinities," is even less available to Westerners, because, so far as I have been able to discover, none of his books have been translated from Arabic. But Fouad Ajami summarizes his work at length in The Arab Predicament (1981), and it is worth quoting at length here:
Kishk's writings belie the notion that Muslim fundamentalists are reactionaries fixated on the image of a theocratic past that has to be restored. In Kishk's world view, cultures clash for preeminence: Some rise and conquer, and others surrender and are subjugated. An old-fashioned thinker, Kishk has no appreciation for what he sees as a fraudulent kind of cosmopolitanism propagated by the West and subscribed to by fifth-column Muslim Arabs. For Kishk there is no such thing as a world civilization; cosmopolitanism is the pretension of the ascendant culture "that asks others to abandon their identity and sovereignty, to dismantle their culture," and gives them a choice between adherence to its postulates or extinction. According to Kishk, what we are witnessing now is the third crusade against the Arab people. The first crusade, using the sword and the cross, realized some victories but was eventually overwhelmed. The second crusade -- the age of imperialism -- began with Napolean's invasion of Egypt in 1798 and succeeded in destroying the self-confidence of the Muslim world. The third crusade picks up where the second left off: It accommodates itself to political independence; instead of using armies, it seeks to penetrate the mind of the Muslim and rearrange it. Once the Muslim accepted the "supremacy of the West -- not just material supremacy but cultural and spiritual supremacy as well -- the Muslim's resistance would collapse; he would become like an open, defenseless city, vulnerable to every plunderer and invader" ….
Kishk argues that cultural and ideological penetration are to the twentieth century what gunboats were to the nineteenth. Marxism, which has succeeded in seducing Arab intellectuals, is but another weapon in the West's ideological assault. For Kishk, it is the westernism of Marx that matters, not his opposition to capitalism. In the duel of civilizations, Marx is clearly on the other side: "Marx did not call for a new civilization: he is a faithful son of Western civilization who formed his theory out of Germany philosophy, French socialism, and English political economy … Marx believed in the values and the history of Western civilization; he was proud of that history which he considered as a triumph for humanity on its way to its final victory. He considered the crimes of Western civilization a historical necessity and did not trace those crimes to the philosophy of that civilization but, rather, to economic necessities."
Marxism was not the only European affliction forced upon the Arab-Muslim world: Another, earlier one was secular nationalism. Kishk is even more contemptuous of secular nationalism than he is of Marxism, more certain of its disruptive consequences. Arabs were so convinced of the power of secular nationalism, so taken by its mystique, he says, that they were willing to set aside their own religious beliefs in pursuit of the nationalist dream. But the history of secular Arab nationalism was a chronicle of defeats and setbacks. It does not strike Kishk as a paradox that the force that generated power for Europe brought weakness to the Arab world. Europe needed secular nationalism, which provided an effective way of organizing a community. But things were different in the Muslim world. Under the banner of Islam, disparate populations and ethnic groups had long been organized into a community. A unique kind of socialist ethos had been part of this community's creed and practice. At the height of its glory, it had laid siege to Vienna and outstripped Europe in the realms of science, philosophy, and culture, as well as war. Then the Muslims caught the germ of nationalism. The Ottoman Turks were the first victims of nationalism; the Arabs were next. The house of Islam was now divided, and Europeans could easily subdue the Muslim world. Minorities were now warring against each other. The concept of nationality, held in check by Islamic universalism, had shattered the basis of the community…
Kishk does not consider the military officers the only culprits [in the 1967 defeat by Israel]. He also blames the radical intellectuals who hammered at the foundations of belief, imported false doctrines, and unleashed the moral confusion that paved the way for the defeat. The radical intellectuals put their faith in concepts such as world peace, brotherhood among nations, and humane socialism, but such beliefs put nations that take them seriously at the mercy of aggressive ones. In this world, the eagle and the sparrow cannot coexist; there can be no brotherhood between the killer and the victim. Human history is built on strife. Islam recognized this truth. The Muslim battle cry "Jihad" was the only thing that frightened the Europeans; it drew the boundaries between belief and unbelief, setting Muslims apart from other men.
