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Questions For Hamas

Marc Lynch had some interesting comments about the Palestinian election yesterday:

The Bush administration has talked a lot about democracy, about past mistakes in American policy towards democracy in the region, and so forth, but I think it's fair to say that most Arabs remain deeply suspicious. Recent Arab elections haven't really tested whether this has changed. Iraq under American military occupation is sui generis. In Egypt there was never any chance that the Muslim Brotherhood would be allowed to actually win, and even if it somehow had Mubarak would have remained in control over a relatively impotent Parliament. Jordan's Parliamentary elections have been sufficiently gerrymandered (via electoral law) to ensure a strict ceiling on Islamist seats. Sudanese Islamists arrived on the back of a military coup.

Hamas winning and presumably moving to form a government is the first real instance of an Islamist movement on the brink of winning power democratically since 1992.* If they take power, we are going to see some major political science propositions put to the test: does power moderate or radicalize Islamist groups? Will they be willing and able to work with non-Islamist parties in a coalition? Will they use their democratic victory to abolish democracy? Will Islamist groups concentrate on the pragmatics of rule or resort to foreign policy grandstanding? Will they use their position of power to pursue terrorism? Will they be willing to set aside doctrine and work pragmatically with Israelis and Americans? Will they use government power to impose unpopular sharia rule over their people? Will they oppress Christian and non-Islamist Muslims? Most academic and policy analysis of these questions has remained counterfactual and hypothetical, since there have been no actual examples of an elected Islamist group in power. That could now change ....

For America, I think it's extremely important right now to handle this right: honor the will of the people, demonstrate a commitment to democratic process, and see what happens. Give Hamas the chance to prove its intentions. Don't get too upset about the inevitable bursts of objectionable rhetoric by excited victors - test deeds, not early words. Above alll, don't give the Islamist hardliners the winning argument they crave about American hypocrisy. Refusing to deal with Hamas right now could effectively kill American attempts to promote democracy in the Middle East for a generation.

That sounds about right to me. Dubya seemed to follow roughly this line in his press conference yesterday when questioned about the election. He made no outright refusal to deal with Hamas and many feel-good statements about the democratic process represented by the election.

But he also made it clear that U.S. willingness to deal with Hamas will be conditioned on Hamas abandoning its call for and commitment to the destruction of Israel. I’m not sure whether refusal to recognize the outcome of the election based on who won vs. refusal to deal with that government based on total opposition to its major policy will be viewed as much more than a distinction without a difference in the Arab world. It is surely an improvement on the outcome in Algeria; there will be no coup, U.S.-backed or otherwise. However, U.S. vs. Arab nation beliefs about what is fair and reasonable when it comes to Israel differ so radically that it may be a mug’s game for the U.S. to try and court Arab public opinion on the issue without substantially altering our policy, and well beyond anything that would be considered acceptable in the U.S.

Lynch is keeping an eye on the Arab media to see how the Palestinian election is being viewed in other Arab countries, so his blog will be well worth checking for the next few days (even more so than usual, I mean).

*Some commenters at Lynch's blog pointed out that an Islamist party had already won a majority, in Turkey. True, but not really comparable since that party is so much more moderate than Hamas, and the tradition of democracy is so much more firmly entrenched (and independently supported by the army) in Turkey than in Palestine. When AK won in Turkey, people were mostly worried about the impact on women’s rights and on Turkey’s ability to join the EU and that sort of thing, not whether there would ever be another election in Turkey. But with Hamas in power, a transition to theocratic fascism is indeed one possible outcome for Palestine.

The Emperor Has Fabulous Clothes

An interesting exhibit at the Sackler Gallery at the Smithsonian: Style and Status: Imperial Costumes from Ottoman Turkey. It’s closing January 22nd, but perhaps the online tour will be up a bit longer than that.

Engagement or Coercion/Katerina Dalacoura

Engagement or Coercion: Weighing Western Human Rights Policies Towards Turkey, Iran and Egypt by Katerina Dalacoura.

(I've reviewed her previous book Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights here). This is a review of various policies adopted by the U.S., the European Union, various nations of Western Europe and Canada and an assortment of NGO's in an effort to promote human rights in the Middle East throughout the 1990's. Dalacoura meticulously documents every peaceful approach tried with respect to the nations mentioned in the title, the full suite of diplomatic tools ranging from verbal pressure to economic punishments, and the failure of each one (unless one counts cosmetic and short-lived changes as success, which she doesn't). So what does Dalacoura think of the Iraq War, you are dying to ask?

If the conclusion of this study, that Western human rights policies have had a limited and ambiguous impact in the Middle East, is correct, the implication, ironically, is that Iraq will democratize only if it is fully taken over and reconstructed by the occupying powers. But if the Iraqi people eventually come to assume responsibility for their affairs, as Japan and Germany did after the Second World War, then the flourishing of democracy and liberal institutions in Iraq is a possibility.

A similar argument was made by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in October 2002: "One of the lessons of more than a decade of democracy promotion around the world is that outsiders are usually marginal players. They become the central determinant of political change only if they are willing to intervene massively, impose a de facto protectorate, and stay for an indefinite, long term. No matter what happens in Iraq, such forceful intervention is unthinkable in most Middle East countries." It is indeed doubtful that the United States and the United Kingdom will be willing to commit the manpower and resources entailed by such an occupation of Iraq. A job left half-done and a quick exit, in the manner of Afghanistan after the US intervention of 2001-2, which left the Kabul government in partial control of the country, is a more likely scenario. This cannot but further discredit the West's commitment to human rights and democracy in the eyes of the people of the Middle East.

Of course that is a false characterization of the situation in Afghanistan. The US and its allies have not yet left Afghanistan; indeed that war isn't actually over yet, and there may be a bit more endgame to be played with respect to the warlords there once it is over. She may be right, she may be wrong; we'll all learn together soon enough I suppose.

Iranian Quote of the Day

Quote of the day, from Persian Mirrors : the Elusive Face of Iran, by Elaine Sciolino (NYT foreign correspondent), on post-revolutionary state-controlled tv in Iran:

"Before long, American shows like Kojak and Star Trek were replaced by revolutionary songs, speeches, poems, and prayers, repeated over and over throughout the day. Unveiled women were banned from TV screens; employees who did not share the view that an Islamic gloss was necessary for every broadcast were fired. Children’s Koran-reading contests appeared. There were so many clerics on television that ordinary people dubbed it "mullahvision" and turned it off. One joke declared that Iranian television was black and white--black turban on channel one and white turban on channel two.

Simply put, revolutionary television was boring. And within a few years it proved no match for a new invention, the VCR. Before long, even ordinary people on limited incomes were saving their money to buy imported VCRs. The clerics struggled to ban trafficking in videos, labeling them "an invitation to prostitutes from the East and West to come into your living room." The campaign didn’t work. And that should not have surprised the Islamic Republic. The revolution itself had been spurred on by contraband tape recordings of Khomeini’s voice preaching from exile. Why should anyone think Iranians would tamely yield to a new regime’s efforts to ban a new kind of tape cassette?

A lively underground business quickly grew up, selling pirated American films illegally on the streets of Tehran before they were sold legally in the United States. Because of the convenience and availability, I saw more first-run films in Tehran than I ever would have seen in the United States.

Then came satellite dishes. They were illegal but in high demand, particularly after intrepid entrepreneurs began producing them locally--which made them one-tenth the cost of foreign-made ones. Newspapers would periodically run stories of police seizures of hundreds of satellite dishes. That only made people more inventive in hiding the dishes: under foliage, elaborate covers of plastic sheeting, or camouflage tarps; in the trees; at the bottom of swimming pools; on balconies and in gardens. Even some of the most seemingly traditional families had "satellite."

Turkish television in particular built an audience with its fare of striptease dancing, violent action films, and soft porn. Then, in the summer of 1999, a massive earthquake struck Turkey, killing more than seventeen thousand people and preempting regular programming for days. "Everywhere I went in Tehran," recalled a friend who was visiting Iran at the time, "I heard complaints that the regular Turkish television shows were not being shown. One taxi driver told me, ‘Okay, I can understand it for one or two days, but it’s been a week of nothing but earthquake.’""

Khaled Abou El Fadl

I recently attended a lecture by Khaled Abou El Fadl on the subject of Islam and Democracy. It was an electrifying lecture; I very much regret not having taken a notebook along, but I never do for things like that, so there you go.

To summarize the bits that stood out for me:

He began by discussing the mass of "potentialities" that exist between the Koran and its reader (and therefore between the Muslim and God; the Koran is considered the direct word of God as revealed to Muhammad, from beginning to end, and in that particular order). He argued that this individual relationship is fundamental to the practice of Islam, and that any human being or state that demands "submission" by Muslims to any given reading of the Koran violates that relationship and therefore Islam itself. His repeated use of the word "submission" in the sense of submission to any person or state claiming Islamic "authority" is highly significant, given that the word "Islam" means "the submission", or "the surrender," to God. In other words, he didn’t come right and call, for example, the mullahs of Iran blasphemous, but this is pretty darn close. He located this interpretation firmly in Islamic sources; to me the most powerful illustration was (I assume) an ahadith in which the Prophet’s son-in-law Ali orders several of the soldiers serving under him in the Prophet’s jihad to commit suicide. Although suicide is clearly condemned in the teachings of the Prophet, they prepare to do so. At the last moment, Ali interrupts them, and takes them to Muhammad, who tells them that this was a test, and that they are never to allow any earthly authority to override their own ethical judgments based on the word of God.

He mentioned what he described as a startling ignorance on the part of even well-educated Muslims of their own history; apparently the history of Islamic civilization as taught in most Middle Eastern universities today usually begins and ends with the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs (i.e., those drawn from within Mohammed’s own community and family in the 40 years or so after his death), at most supplemented in some cases by the Abbasid Dynasty which immediately followed. If I understood correctly, he attributes some of what he described as the "childishness" of trying to recreate this past in the modern political context ("The West will be defeated, and Islam will burst forth, and then watch out!") to this ignorance of how Islamic civilization has unfolded and changed over the intervening 1400 years. (It’s a significant erasure to be sure, given the great diversity of ethnicities, cultures, sects, and governments that have been gathered under the banner of Islam over those years. As a practical matter I can’t help but wonder how the last hundred years are explained at all without reference to the decline of the Ottomans). He seemed particularly pained at the way the focus on the Western "conspiracy" against Islam leads Muslims in the Middle East to study Western history to the exclusion of their own.

He discussed at length the way that treating Islam as itself a civilization or political ideology empties it of its ethical and aesthetic meaning. Strikingly, he began this part of the lecture by saying something on the order of "I utterly reject … I think I am ready to come out and say this now … I utterly reject any interpretation of Islam that denies its aesthetic qualities," and then launched into a critique of the work of Muhammad Jalal Kishk (whose work was summarized at length in a long quote I swiped from Fouad Ajami in an earlier entry). When I Abou el Fadl’s bio (linked above) the next day I was surprised to learn that Kishk had been a "beloved" teacher of Abou el Fadl’s, then later permitted his scholarship to be bought and paid for by the Saudis. (This perhaps explains at least the peculiarly pragmatic, completely politicized quality of his Wahhabist ideas which I found so startling when I read them. I can’t help but wonder if Kishk so deftly conceals any spiritual connection to Islam in his writings on Islam as a method of keeping at least one thing for himself.)

But for me, the most interesting part of the talk was elicited by a question from the audience. It went right to the heart of something I’ve been wondering about lately, which is the question of how the authority of the law is derived for Muslims in the Middle East, if not from the Koran. It occurred to me in the course of reading Bernard Lewis’s The Emergence of Modern Turkey (which I may never finish; it’s heavy going, written for other historians rather than a general audience), when Lewis mentioned that one of the reasons the French Revolution furnished the primary idea of Western democracy in Turkey rather than the American Revolution is that it was entirely secular, and thus could not be understood as some incursion of Christendom on Islamic soil. (The probably more important reason is that, in the process of trying to discover how to defeat the French militarily, the Ottomans had recruited a number of French scholars and military men in order to learn the methods of the enemy; as a result, for many years if Turks spoke a foreign language at all, it was French). The irony is that the American Revolution, for all of its God talk, was not really all that specifically Christian. As I understand it, the founders’ notion of natural law was based more on empirical observation and reasoning than Christian theology. Their particular understanding of human nature included God in the sense that God created human beings and therefore created this nature that they were observing and attempting to accommodate in a governmental system. (As an aside to a seminarian friend of mine, who was lately complaining about having to defend her unprovable faith to secular humanists, I point out that the American notions of human rights and the moral quality of human freedom are ultimately articles of faith as well. They can certainly also be defended by their social utility, but such a defense make them contingent rather than universal, whereas the notion of "rights" denies contingency and is instead absolute. "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that Man is endowed by his Creator with certain inalienable rights …" Whether you think the fast move in that phrase is in the "self-evident" or in the "Creator" is probably a matter of your own predispositions.) Anyway, I think you can see how such an evolution would be somewhat less than persuasive to people who are habituated to the notion of law being derived directly from the word of God.

I couldn’t hear the questioner distinctly, but the gist of the question was whether a democratic government shouldn’t somehow have God at its head, rather than simply authorizing people to do whatever they wanted. It was apparent that he’d heard this question before, based on the assumption that democracy must be inherently amoral and therefore dangerous. His answer was startling in its simplicity: "God IS the Sovereign. This is a simple empirical fact. No human government can either enable the sovereignty of God, or undermine it." He then discussed the way that democratic government must be underpinned by moral concerns based on God’s law, but he reiterated that attempting to derive one interpretation of God’s law in order to codify it and impose it on others violates the freedom of conscience that is essential to the ethical meaning of the Islamic faith. He pointed to the Christian values underlying the American practice of democracy as an example of how this works, despite the strict separation of church and state. (He pointed out, however, that this separation is an "oddity" in Western democracies, one based on our own peculiar history that is not duplicated in other functioning democracies).

It turns out that we have a couple of his books at the library, so I checked them out, including Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women. I’ve gone a little bit into it, and already I think I probably don’t fully understand his position regarding the practice of Islamic law. He does clearly state that he is a believing Muslim, and thinks the will of God can be found in the Koran, and is worth searching for from within the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence. I don’t know if he regards this as a practice that would enrich a secular legal discourse, or if he still sees Islamic law as something that has a role in jurisprudence if not in legislation. I don’t know if I’ll find out immediately either; on the one hand, this book was evidently written just for me, but on the other, it is legal theory, and though the writing is lucid enough, the concepts are difficult. It’s a 10 minutes per page kind of deal, and its structure is front-loaded with theory. The actual case law on women is in the final two chapters; I’ve already peeked and I don’t think I’ll be able to understand it properly without the theory. Unfortunately, I also further peeked and read the short summaries of the tortured, horrifically misogynist decisions he's critiquing, and I just gotta read the smackdown. What to do?