For those who, like me, found Chirac’s motion in the UN to deny the U.S. & U.K. the power to administer post-war Iraq somewhat surreal, and his subsequent announcement of a move to create a new security arrangement consisting of France, Germany and Belgium suicidal (the idea of withdrawing U.S. troops from Germany and the U.S. from NATO and the UN as a punishment of "old" Europe has been floating around the blogosphere for a while now), here is a rational explanation of Chirac’s policy goals.
Also, here is an interpretation of what the big security picture for the US without the UN might look like, and why. The same author elaborates on his term “fantasy ideology” here; I recognized enough of the far left activists I used to hang with in college, and, indeed, of my former self to find this a rather persuasive portrait of Al Qaeda psychology. As for his main thesis, I just don’t know. This is in some respects the opposite of what I had thought the grand strategy was; i.e., Mr. de Villepin’s dark suspicion that the U.S. had “dreams of remaking the Middle East in its own image of democracy,” to quote the New York Times. Various Arab nations appear to be bargaining already with anticipated U.S. hegemony in the region upon the very assumption that it will create pressure for democracy, but we could all be misreading the tea leaves together. There is yet another possibility that the administration is merely feeling its way with these security issues and has no grand strategy to speak of; certainly the dissension among Bush advisors on this and many other points has been widely reported. I’m feeling very agnostic at the moment.
M. said: I think the fantasy ideology thing is certainly an element of something like the LSD shutdown. But when I was discussing it with L. the day it happened, I opined that another one is a straightforward assertion of power. Actions like that aren't intended to win converts to the cause, they're intended to exhibit the size and power of the movement, to reassure allies that they're not alone and powerless and to intimidate the opposition. Compare Critical Mass, where a bunch of bike riders ride en masse and block motorized traffic-- the name itself points to the idea that their numbers, while small on an absolute scale, are sufficient to force the public to pay attention to them and make policy changes, or else suffer the consequences. (My impression is that it hasn't worked terribly well, but that's partly because people who use bikes as a serious form of transportation really are a tiny minority. If they were a double-digit percentage of the population, that might probably be a different matter.)
I don't think much of those sorts of tactics, since the entire thrust is to hold people of all viewpoints hostage to a comparatively small group of activists. But I'd guess that they can work to some extent, if there's enough overall support for the goal. As much as they may alienate potential supporters, they also create an immediate issue that needs to be addressed, and "give them X if it'll make them go away" isn't an unheard of reaction. (Neither, of course, is "hit them with the tear gas and arrest the ones you catch", though how that's handled can give one side or the other a publicity victory.)
I doubt that it's likely to be productive in this particular case, since it's unlikely that Congress or the administration cares about local traffic problems. (I'd certainly hope that we're not going to start making foreign policy on the basis of traffic jams.) I do think that people are likely to magnify their overall support and the level of impact they're likely to have. But I don't think that it's purely fantasy that drives these sorts of activities-- they can be used to practical effect in some situations, for better or worse.
I replied: FWIW, from what I've managed to gather about radical Islam so far, the 9/11 bombing also may have had a practical purpose, that of making new recruits. A movement that can pull off something like that against the West must have something going for it, right? And if the U.S. really had begun adjusting its foreign policy goals to suit Al-Qaeda as some people urged, for example by immediately pulling our troups out of Saudi Arabia, or simply abandoning Israel, then so much the better for them. However, when you follow the circle around to the agenda that Al-Qaeda is actually recruiting for, it's back to fantasy-land; embedded in the recruiting power of 9/11, if it had any, is the idea that killing the infidel is a good in and of itself.
M. said: Meanwhile, Steven Den Beste suggests another motivation for unpopular protest tactics: they may serve to bind the people involved to one another more tightly by giving them a shared unpleasant experience and alienating them somewhat from the rest of society. He draws parallels to fraternity hazings, military traditions, and distinctive clothing worn by religious minorities:
"[I]f a given group always goes around in public wearing strange robes and with most of their hair shaved and a strange braided pigtail, they tend to get strange looks from others, and quite often are avoided or treated with disdain. In some members this will eventually cause them to give up and leave, but it's more common for them to bond more closely to the group because of this. And disdain is given for disdain received; they hate us because they know we're better than they are ... [E]ven if these demonstrations have had little political effect at all, or outright negative effect, on the public as a whole, it also has the effect of making those in the movement itself particularly dedicated to the cause. There's little practical difference between wearing weird robes and dancing and chanting on a street corner, and having a vomit-in at City Hall."
I replied: I think he's on to something there. On one of the news reports I saw of demonstrations in Daley Plaza last week, an organizer was explaining to Dubya: "You have created a movement that is not going away any time soon!!"